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Observing Actions in Bayesian Games
Dominik Grafenhofer, Wolfgang Kuhle1
Abstract: We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private in-
formation over the game’s payoff structure, and over each others’ actions. If private
information over actions is precise, we find that agents can coordinate on multiple equilib-
ria. If private information over actions is of low quality, equilibrium uniqueness obtains
like in a standard global games setting. The current model, with its flexible information
structure, can thus be used to study phenomena such as bank-runs, currency crises, reces-
sions, riots, and revolutions, where agents rely on information over each others’ actions.
Keywords: Coordination Games, Equilibrium Selection, Global Games
ERNIE: There is something funny going on over there at the bank, George, I’ve never
really seen one, but that’s got all the earmarks of a run.
PASSERBY: Hey, Ernie, if you have any money in the bank, you better hurry.2
1 Introduction
Coordination games are used extensively to model situations, such as bank runs, currency
crises, or riots and revolutions. The distinguishing feature of such games is that agents
have a strong incentive to choose mutually consistent strategies.
One way to study such games is to assume complete information, i.e., players know the
model’s payoff relevant coefficients and each others’ equilibrium actions. This approach
tends to produce multiple, pure strategy, equilibria. These equilibria have been criticized
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on the grounds that players often cannot observe the game’s payoff structure with per-
fect accuracy. Rubinstein (1989), Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin
(1998) argue that agents have to rely on noisy private information over the game’s payoff
relevant coefficients.3 In such games, each agent has to use his own signal over the game’s
payoffs to infer the signals, and thus the actions, of the other agents. Such inference
makes it difficult to coordinate on multiple equilibria. In particular, whenever private
information over the game’s payoffs is very precise, but not perfect, the global games
structure ensures equilibrium uniqueness.
To understand the equilibria that agents play, we argue that agent’s information over
the game’s payoff coefficients and information over each other’s actions are of particular
importance. The global games approach of Rubinstein (1989), Carlsson and van Damme
(1993) and Morris and Shin (1998), focuses only on one of these types of information, i.e.
information over fundamentals, and assumes away the other. In the current paper, we
build a model where agents simultaneously use information on the game’s payoffs, as well
as, information over each others’ actions.
Information over actions plays a dual role. First, actions depend on the game’s payoff
coefficient, and signals over actions therefore carry information over the games’ payoff
coefficients. In this interpretation, the signal over actions is just another signal over the
game’s fundamental. Taking this view, private information over actions should reinforce
the global games equilibrium selection mechanism, where private information over fun-
damentals generates unique equilibria. The second function of signals over actions is, of
course, that they inform players of each others’ actions, which helps coordination. In
equilibrium, we find that this second effect dominates, and multiple equilibria are ensured
whenever private information over actions is sufficiently precise.
In our model, runs feed on themselves: the size of the attack A is an increasing
function π(A) of the attack itself. That is, increases in the mass of attacking agents are
observed, and induce additional agents to join the run. In turn, this increase in attacking
agents convinces even more bystanders to join the run. The strength of this infectious
3Harsanyi and Selten (1988) review the earlier literature on strategic uncertainty and equilibrium
selection.
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process increases with the private signal’s precision, and agents can coordinate on multiple
equilibria whenever the precision with which they observe each other is sufficiently high.
Interpretation: Riots and revolutions, currency crises, bank-runs, recessions, or flights
to quality, are social phenomena where agents observe, learn from, and emulate each oth-
ers’ actions. That is, in the context of a bank-run, depositors can observe the length of a
queue, respectively the lack thereof, in front of their local bank branch.4 Similarly, during
a currency crises, commercial banks observe their clients’ order flow, which helps them
decide whether or not it is worth while to join the run. Individual traders, who participate
in the currency market, have conversations about their positions in the "Mexican Peso"
or the "British Pound." Cartel members examine whether their partners are undercutting
the agreed on price. In the context of business-cycles, where firms have an incentive to
produce whenever the other’s are producing, firms closely monitor the level of "economic
activity".5 Finally, during riots and revolutions, the inhabitants of large towns can see
whether the number of protesters in the street is large or small. In turn, "policy makers"
enforce curfews, limit internet access, and shut down social media sites in an effort to
conceal unrest.
Related literature: Rubinstein (1989), Carlsson and van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin
(1998), Frankel et al. (2003) show that global games select unique equilibria when private
information over the game’s fundamental is sufficiently precise. Morris and Shin (2000,
2004), Hellwig (2002) and Metz (2002) emphasize that public signals can restore multiplic-
ity. Atkeson (2000) and Angeletos and Werning (2006) argue that stock prices aggregate
and publicize private information in a manner that brings back multiplicity when private
information over fundamentals is sufficiently precise. Hellwig (2002), Morris and Shin
4Indeed, to avoid queues, which extend out to the street, bank lobbies are traditionally rather large.
That is, large lobbies reduce the precision with which agents can observe each other, which makes coor-
dination harder. Diamond and Dybvig (1983), p. 408, stress the importance of queues in the context of
bank runs. Their "sequential service constraint" formalizes that agents who withdraw early can front-run
agents who come late. The current model emphasizes that such a delay in service is observable, and
attracts agents who wouldn’t withdraw otherwise.
5See the Diamond (1982) type models for macro settings, where agents’ production choices are strategic
complements.
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(2007) and Monderer and Samet (1989) show that the global games mechanism relies on
signal structures that generate low common p-belief.
The current model links the global games theory to the herding literature, Scharfstein and Stein
(1990), Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Banerjee (1992), where agents’ actions reveal in-
formation over unknown fundamentals. This channel is present in the current model.
Private information over actions informs agents about the game’s fundamental. Following
the classic global games logic, such a signal should lower common p-believes, respectively,
make it harder for agents to coordinate on multiple equilibria. While present, this channel
is overcompensated by the fact that agents also learn about each others’ strategies, which
makes coordination easier.
Angeletos and Werning (2006) and Dasgupta (2007) find that public signals over ac-
tions, just like public signals over fundamentals, help agents to coordinate on multiple
equilibria. The present model shows that private signals over actions, unlike private sig-
nals over fundamentals, induce multiple equilibria if they are sufficiently precise. That
is, contrary to the global games logic, where precise “private information" yields unique
equilibria, we provide an example where private signals ensure multiple equilibria.
The importance of information over actions has been emphasized in a separate litera-
ture on “conjectural equilibria." Battigalli and Guaitoli (1997), Minelli and Polemarchakis
(2003), Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1994), and Esponda (2013), develop models where
agents receive noisy signals over each other’s actions.6 The current model thus brings
together arguments from the literature on conjectural equilibrium, emphasizing noisy
information over actions, with arguments from the literature on global games, where
uncertainty over actions originates from parameter uncertainty.
Finally, we contribute to the effort aimed at enriching the global games structure.
Izmalkov and Yildiz (2010), Steiner and Steward (2011), Kuhle (2016), Grafenhofer and Kuhle
(2016), Bergemann and Morris (2015), Binmore and Samuelson (2001), Angeletos et al.
(2007), Mathevet (2012), Frankel (2012) add heterogenous priors, multidimensional signal
6In a similar gist, Hahn (1977, 1978) analyzes Walrasian economies, where agents hold conjectures
over each others’ supply and demand functions, which need not be true. Guesnerie (2002) studies the
relation between common knowledge, agents’ conjectures, and the theory of rational expectations.
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structures, applications to mechanism design and dynamic information revelation.
Organization: Section 2 outlines the model. Sections 3 and 3.1 contain the main
results. In Section 4, we reduce the dimensionality of our model, and Section 4.2 illustrates
our findings for normally distributed variables. Section 5 concludes.
2 A coordination game with dominance regions
There is a status quo and a unit measure of agents indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Each of these
agents i can choose between two actions ai ∈ {0, 1}. Choosing ai = 1 means to attack the
status quo. Choosing ai = 0 means that the agent abstains from attacking the status quo.
An attack on the status quo is associated with a cost c ∈ (0, 1). If the attack is successful,
the status quo is abandoned, and attacking agents receive a net payoff 1 − c > 0. If the
attack is not successful, an attacking agent’s net payoff is −c. The payoff for an agent
who does not attack is normalized to zero. The status quo is abandoned if the aggregate
size of the attack A :=
∫ 1
0
aidi exceeds the strength of the status quo θ, i.e., if A > θ.
Otherwise, if A < θ, the status quo is maintained, and the attack fails.
θ
0 1
Attack Coordination No attack
Figure 2
Figure 2 illustrates that the fundamental θ can fall into three regions. First, if θ < 0,
the status quo is abandoned, regardless of how many agents attack. If an agent knows that
θ < 0, he should attack regardless of strategic considerations. Second, when θ ∈ (0, 1),
agents are in a coordination game, where the mass of attacking agents is crucial for the
game’s payoffs. Third, if θ > 1, the mass of attacking agents is always too small to
overcome the status quo, and not attacking is the dominant strategy. To characterize the
equilibria that agents play when they have incomplete information over the fundamental
θ, we start with an example.
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3 Information and Equilibrium
Regarding agents’ information we assume that players hold a uniform uninformative prior
over the distribution of θ. Moreover, we assume that each player i receives two kinds of
private information: a noisy signal xi over the strength of the status quo θ, and another
signal yi over the other players’ actions A:
Signal over the fundamental: xi = θ + ǫ
x
i
Signal over the aggregate attack: yi = A + ǫ
y
i
(1)
The structure of the game, in particular the distribution of error terms in (1), is common
knowledge. The exogenous fundamental θ and the endogenous size of the attack A(θ),
however, are not common knowledge. Each agent uses his private signals xi, yi to infer
these two key variables.
Agents choose their strategies ai to maximize expected utility:
E[U(ai)|xi, yi] = ai(P (θ < A|xi, yi)− c). (2)
Action ai = 1 is thus optimal whenever P (θ < A|xi, yi) ≥ c. Agents are just indifferent
between attacking and not attacking when signals xi and yi are such that P
∗ := c. Finally,
we denote the joint probability distribution function of the error terms by f(ǫx, ǫy). Given
agents’ information, and the critical probability P ∗, we can define:
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). An aggregate attack function A(θ) is an equilibrium of the
game, if for all θ ∈ R the following holds7:
A(θ) =
∫
R2
χ{(ǫx,ǫy):P [A(θ)≥θ|xi=θ+ǫx,yi=A(θ)+ǫy ,A(·)]≥P ∗} f(ǫ
x, ǫy) dǫxdǫy. (3)
To characterize equilibria, we start with an example where signal errors are bounded:
Proposition 1. Suppose that ǫyi ∈ [−σ, σ], i.e. f(ǫx, ǫy) = 0 for all |ǫy| > σ and all
ǫx ∈ R. Further assume that the precision of the signal about the aggregate attack yi is
precise enough, i.e. 0 < σ < 1
2
. Then, there exists a continuum of equilibria.
7χ denotes the indicator function.
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Proof. Pick an arbitrary t ∈ [0, 1] and define
At(θ) :=


1 θ < t
0 otherwise.
(4)
θ
t
0
1
At(θ)
To establish that At functions (4) are equilibria, we have to show that (3) holds. First,
we determine the distribution of signal realizations yi for a given θ. There are two cases:
Case θ < t : yi = 1 + ǫ
y
i > 1− σ ≥ 12
Case θ ≥ t : yi = 0 + ǫyi < σ ≤ 12 .
(5)
Notice, that signal realizations yi do not overlap: when θ < t all signal realizations are
above 1
2
. On the contrary, whenever θ > t all signal realizations are below 1
2
.
yi
1
2
θ ≥ t θ < t
Now suppose that an agents learns that his signal yi is larger than
1
2
: then he knows that
this is only possible when θ < t. In turn, θ < t means that a successful attack is underway,
which he should join. Indeed, using the conjecture At(θ), we know that all agents will
attack.
If the agent’s signal yi is smaller than
1
2
, he knows θ < t. That is, given the conjectured
aggregate attack At(θ), the attack is not successful. Hence, it is optimal for the agent to
abstain from attacking.
Equation 3 holds for all θ: when θ < t all agents attack, and the aggregate attack is
1. In the other case, no agent attacks and the aggregate attack is 0. Thus, At(θ) satisfies
the requirements of an equilibrium.
Within the current class of equilibria (4), coordination is perfect: Diagram 3 illustrates
that we have either a successful attack At = 1, in which all agents participate, or no
7
attack A = 0. This perfect coordination relies on the compact support of yi|A, i.e, the
error term. Large realizations of A shift yi signals such that all agents are willing to
attack. Small realizations of A shift agents’ observations yi such that all agents abstain
from attacking. In Section 3.1, we relax the assumption of compact support and derive
our results for games where the noise terms’ support is unbounded. For these games,
signals over actions are never fully revealing, but they are still sufficiently informative
such that runs feed on themselves, and multiple equilibria obtain. That is, increases in A
shift observations yi by enough such that a sufficient number of agents join a run. Except
for the noise in agents’ private signals, we maintain the assumptions from the previous
section.
3.1 Unbounded Errors
When agents’ signal errors have unbounded support, agents can never be sure entirely
sure whether they are joining a successful run or a hopeless effort. Hence, contrary to
Proposition 1, perfect coordination is impossible. That said, runs continue to feed on
themselves in the same manner as before, and multiple equilibria obtain whenever private
information over actions is sufficiently precise:
Proposition 2. Assume that ǫxi and ǫ
y
i are distributed according to pdf f = fxfy (cdfs
Fx, Fy), where fx and fy are symmetric.
8 There exist δ > 0, γ > 0, and ξ > 0 such that
1− δ ≥ γ, 1 > 3δ + 2γ and the following conditions hold:
Fx(ξ)
1− Fx(ξ)
supa∈[0,δ] fy(η − a)
infa∈[1−δ,1] fy(η − a) ≤
1− c
c
for all η ≥ 1− δ − γ (6)
Fx[ξ]Fy[γ] ≥ 1− δ (7)
Whenever these conditions hold, there exists a continuum of equilibria.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The proof of Proposition 2 relies on an iteration argument: we start with a guess
A0t (θ) and compute a best response A
1
t (θ). In turn, A
1
t (θ) yields another best response
8The symmetry assumption shortens the proof, and can otherwise be discarded.
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A2t (θ) and so on... . In a second step, we show that this iteration allows to construct
a converging sequence of aggregate attacks/best responses. In the limit, we obtain an
equilibrium attack function for every t. Finally, since there is a continuum of permissible
t values, we have a continuum of equilibria.
To interpret conditions (6) and (7), we use an
Example 1. Suppose error terms ǫx, ǫy are normally distributed, and denote the precisions
of the respective signals by αx =
1
σ2x
and αy =
1
σ2y
. For that case, we have fx(ξ) = φ(
√
αxξ)
and Fx(ξ) = Φ(
√
αxξ) and fy(γ) = φ(
√
αyγ) and Fy(γ) = Φ(
√
αyγ), where φ and Φ
represent the density and cumulative density functions of the standard normal distribution.
In turn, we can choose δ and γ such that 1 > 3δ + 2γ, e.g., δ = .2 γ = .1. Moreover,
we can choose αxξ > Φ
−1(.8). Finally we let αy → ∞, such that (6) and (7) are both
satisfied.
Example 1 allows for an interpretation of our findings: multiple equilibria are ensured
only when the precision with which agents can observe actions is large. To illustrate the
mechanisms behind the multiplicity result in Proposition 2 more clearly, we now focus on
an alternative, one-dimensional, signal structure.
4 Information over the Tipping Point
Instead of observing fundamentals and actions separately, we now think of a model where
agents simply observe one signal that informs them whether the economy is far away or
close to the "tipping point." That is, agents observe a signal over A − θ, which informs
them whether the status quo will be abandoned or not. In the context of a currency crisis,
such a variable can be interpreted as net outflows from a specific currency, respectively,
the change in foreign currency reserves of the central bank. In the context of riots and
revolutions, agents observe the degree to which protesters and outnumber the police.
We proceed in two steps. First, we study general distribution functions, and distinguish
between bounded and unbounded error terms. Compared to the results from Sections 3,
we find that "precise private information" always ensures multiple equilibria. Second, we
add an example, where errors are normally distributed, as an illustration. This example
9
makes transparent how multiple run equilibria obtain in situations, where agents observe
each others actions.
Suppose that agents receive only one signal:
zi = A− θ + ρi, (8)
which informs about the likelihood that an attack succeeds.
Proposition 3. Suppose that ρi ∈ [−σ, σ], and that the precision of the signal about the
aggregate attack yi is precise enough, i.e. 0 < σ <
1
2
Then, there exist a continuum of
equilibria.
Sketch of proof. The proof is parallel to that of Proposition 1: pick an arbitrary t ∈
(σ, 1− σ) and define At(θ). The signal realizations for different θ are:
Case θ < t : zi = 1− θ + ρi > σ + ρi ≥ 0
Case θ ≥ t : zi = −θ + ρi ≤ −σ + ρi ≤ 0.
(9)
Again, there is no overlap in signal realizations in both cases, and the remainder of the
argument is parallel to the proof of Proposition 1.
4.1 Unbounded Errors
We denote by G the cumulative distribution function of the error ρi, and by g = G
′ the
respective probability distribution function9. Again, we simply our proof and assume that
g is supposed to be symmetric around 0. Regarding θ, we assume that agents hold an
uninformative uniform prior.
Proposition 4. Suppose that there exist δ > 0 and γ > 0 such that the following condi-
tions hold:
1−G(ξ − α)
G(ξ − β) ≥
1− c
c
, for all ξ ≥ 1− δ − γ, α ∈ [0, δ], and β ∈ [1− δ, 1] (10)
G(γ) ≥ 1− δ, and (11)
g(δ − γ) < 1 (12)
Then, there exists a continuum of equilibria.
9We assume that G is differentiable, i.e., we rule out atoms
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Proof. See Appendix B.
The proof strategy is to start for fixed t with a guess of the equilibrium aggregate
attack, and then compute the best response to that attack. This yields another guess for
the aggregate attack, to which we compute the best response.... . We use this argument to
construct a converging sequence of aggregate attack guesses. The limit aggregate attack
is an equilibrium, which is different for different choices of t.
4.2 Normally Distributed Errors
To illustrate the origins of equilibrium multiplicity, let us assume that agents i ∈ [0, 1]
receive private information:
zi = A− θ + σzξi, ξi ∼ N (0, 1). (13)
The signal zi therefore informs player i with precision αz :=
1
σz
of the attack’s net size
A− θ, and we have
Proposition 5. If private information is precise, αz >
√
2π, agents can coordinate on
multiple equilibria.
Proof. We proceed in three steps. First, we compute the threshold signal z∗, for which
agents are indifferent between attacking and not attacking. Given this threshold, we
compute the mass of attacking agents. Third, we show that there exist multiple equilibria.
1.) Payoff indifference condition (PIC): Given a signal zi, agents i choose an action
ai ∈ {0, 1}, to maximize expected utility:
E[Ui] = ai(P (A− θ > 0|zi)− c). (14)
Agent i is therefore just indifferent between attacking, ai = 1, and not attacking, ai = 0,
when he receives a signal zi = z
∗ such that:
P (A− θ > 0|z∗) = c. (15)
It follows from (15) that agents attack if z > z∗, and they will abstain from attacking
whenever z ≤ z∗.
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2.) Given the critical signal z∗, we can compute the mass of attacking agents:
A = P (z > z∗|A, θ) (16)
For normally distributed signal errors, (16) can be rewritten as:
A = 1− Φ(αz(z∗ − A+ θ)), (17)
where Φ() is the cumulative normal distribution. From (17), we have
Lemma 1. If αz >
1√
2π
then, for every level z∗, there exists an interval [θˇ(z∗), θˆ(z∗)] such
that (17) has three solutions Aj(θ, z
∗), j = 1, 2, 3 whenever θ ∈ [θˇ(z∗), θˆ(z∗)].
To construct equilibrium functions At(θ, z
∗), we use the solutions Aj(θ; z∗) from Lemma
1. More specifically, we focus on the solutions j = 1, 3 such that we obtain functions
At(θ; z
∗), which are downward sloping ∂At
∂θ
< 0. Given these functions, it remains to show
that there exist values z∗ that satisfy the payoff indifference condition
P (At(θ, z
∗)− θ > 0|z∗) = c. (18)
In Appendix C we show that there exist small values zˇ such that P (At(θ, zˇ)−θ > 0|zˇ) > c
and large values zˆ such that P (At(θ, zˆ)− θ > 0|zˆ) < c.
Equilibrium values z∗ are thus ensured: these values z∗ can either obtain as solutions
to (18), or the critical z∗ values are those values where the function P (At(θ, z∗) − θ >
0|z∗) is discontinuous in z∗. In that case we have a z∗, such that for small δ > 0,
P (At(θ, z
∗ + δ) − θ > 0|z∗ + δ) > c and P (At(θ, z∗ − δ) − θ > 0|z∗ − δ) < c. That is,
the expected value of attacking/not attacking changes discontinuously at z∗, and z∗ is the
agents’ equilibrium cutoff value.
The current example, in particular equation (17), illustrates how runs feed on them-
selves: the size of the attack A is an increasing function π(A) of the attack itself. Put
differently, increases in the mass of attacking agents increase the mass of agents who re-
ceive high signal realizations, and thus induce more agents to join the run. This increase
in the number of attacking agents is once again visible, and induces even more agents to
run... . Hence, if the private signal’s precision is sufficiently high, runs feed on themselves,
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and agents can coordinate on multiple equilibria. Put differently, when bystanders see
that the riot police is outnumbered, they are tempted to join in on the protest, which, in
turn, attracts an even bigger turn-out... .
5 Discussion
Suppose you are passing by your local bank branch, and you see people lining up to
withdraw money. Suppose also, that you have some knowledge of the bank’s balance
sheet and it’s cash reserves "θ". How would you choose your strategy?
Following the global games logic, you know that your information over θ is correlated
with the other agents’ information over θ. Accordingly, you can use your signal over
the bank’s balance sheet to infer the other agents’ information over the bank’s balance
sheet. In turn, since all agents condition their actions on their information over the bank’s
finances, you can compute a posterior distribution over the other players’ actions.
Alternatively, you can use your information over the other players’ actions: If you see
people lining up in front of your local bank, a run is underway, and you should withdraw
your money while you can. On the contrary, if nobody lines up to withdraw, then there
is probably no run, and you do not have to act.
The current framework takes the middle ground between these two extremes: agents
observe each others’ actions, and they do think about the fundamental. The model is
thus flexible enough to accommodate a range of environments that vary regarding the
information that agents have over each others’ actions and over fundamentals.
In the context of bank-runs, currency crises, or riots and revolutions, agents will
arguably monitor each others’ actions closely, and the current model predicts that pre-
cise private information brings back multiplicity. Another application concerns models
of aggregate economic activity,10 where firms’ production choices depend on aggregate
economic activity and exogenous fundamentals.
10In Diamond (1982) type models, firms face a binary production choice, and the probability of making
a sale increases with the level of overall economic activity A and monetary policy θ.
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A Proof of Proposition 2
To prove Proposition 2 we begin with a lemma, which collects a number of useful proper-
ties. In Section A.1 we use these properties, together with the theorem of Arzelà–Ascoli,
to show that there exists a continuum of equilibria At(θ). Regarding notation A
n
t (t
−) and
Ant (t
+) denote left and right limits of the function At(θ) depicted in Diagram 3.
Lemma 2. Suppose that for a given t A(θ) ∈ [1−δ, 1] if θ < t, and A(θ) ∈ [0, δ] otherwise.
Then the following holds:
1. If yi ≥ 1− δ − γ and xi ≤ t+ ξ, then P [θ < t|A(·), (xi, yi)] ≥ c.
2. If yi ≤ δ + γ and x ≥ t− ξ, then P [θ ≥ t|A(·), (xi, yi)] ≥ c.
3. P [yi ≥ 1− δ − γ ∩ x ≤ t + ξ|A(·), θ < t] ≥ 1− δ
4. P [yi ≤ δ + γ ∩ x > t− ξ|A(·), θ ≥ t] ≥ 1− δ
Proof. 1. To prove the first statement, we define
κN :=
∫ t+N
t
fx(xi − θ)fy(yi − A(θ)) dθ∫ t
t−N fx(xi − θ)fy(yi −A(θ)) dθ
,
and show that the first two conditions can be reduced to statements about κN . We
denote by U tN the uniform distribution of θ over the interval [t−N, t +N ].
P [θ < t|A(·), (xi, yi)] = lim
N→∞
P [θ < t ∧ (xi, yi)|A(·),U tN ]
P [(xi, yi)|A(·),U tN ]
= lim
N→∞
∫ t
t−N
1
2N
fx(xi − θ)Fy(yi − A(θ)) dθ∫ t
t−N
1
2N
fx(xi − θ)fy(yi −A(θ)) dθ +
∫ t+N
t
1
2N
fx(xi − θ)fy(yi −A(θ)) dθ
= lim
N→∞
1
1 + κN
≥ c⇔ lim
N→∞
κN ≤ 1− c
c
Using appropriate variable transformations (τ = θ−t in the nominator and τ = t−θ
in the denominator) and symmetry of fx we get
κN =
∫ N
0
fx(xi − (t+ τ))fy(yi −A(t + τ)) dτ∫ N
0
fx(xi − (t− τ))fy(yi −A(t− τ)) dτ
.
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Recall, that yi ≥ 1− δ − γ and xi ≤ t+ ξ holds in this case.
κN ≤
∫ N
0
fx(xi − (t + τ)) dτ∫ N
0
fx(xi − (t− τ)) dτ
supa∈[0,δ] fy(yi − a)
infa∈[1−δ,1] fy(yi − a)
=
Fx(xi − t)− Fx(xi − t−N)
Fx(xi − t+N)− Fx(xi − t)
supa∈[0,δ] fy(yi − a)
infa∈[1−δ,1] fy(yi − a)
−→
N→∞
Fx(xi − t)
1− Fx(xi − t)
supa∈[0,δ] fy(yi − a)
infa∈[1−δ,1] fy(yi − a)
≤ Fx(ξ)
1− Fx(ξ)
supa∈[0,δ] fy(yi − a)
infa∈[1−δ,1] fy(yi − a) ≤
1− c
c
The last but one inequality uses condition (6).
2. The proof of the second statement relies on the same arguments used in 1. First,
observe that
P [θ ≥ t|A(·), (xi, yi)] = lim
N→∞
1
1 + 1
κN
≥ c⇔ lim
N→∞
1
κN
≤ 1− c
c
.
Note that yi ≤ δ + γ and x ≥ t− ξ holds. Again, we can obtain a statement:
1
κN
≤ 1− Fx(−ξ)
Fx(−ξ)
supa∈[1−δ,1] fy(yi − a)
infa∈[0,δ] fy(yi − a)
=
Fx(ξ)
1− Fx(ξ)
supa∈[0,δ] fy((1− yi)− a)
infa∈[1−δ,1] fy((1− yi)− a) ≤
1− c
c
.
The equality uses the symmetry of Fx and fy. The last inequality exploits condition
(6) (note that (1− yi) > 1− δ − γ).
3. The third statement follows from condition (7). Regarding notation, we use Ant (t
−)
to denote left limits of the function At depicted in Diagram 3:
P [yi ≥ 1− δ − γ ∧ x ≤ t + ξ|A(·), θ < t]
≥ P [yi ≥ 1− δ − γ ∧ x ≤ t+ ξ|A(θ) = 1− δ, θ = t−]
≥ Fx[t+ ξ − t](1− Fy[1− δ − γ − (1− δ)]) = Fx[ξ]Fy[γ] ≥ 1− δ (19)
4. The fourth statement follows from condition (7) and the following inequalities:
P [yi ≤ δ + γ ∧ x > t− ξ|A(·), θ ≥ t]
≥ P [yi ≤ δ + γ ∧ x > t− ξ|A(θ) = δ, θ = t]
≥ Fy[γ](1− Fx[−ξ]) = Fx[ξ]Fy[γ] ≥ 1− δ (20)
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A.1 Iteration
We now use an iteration to prove the existence of an equilibrium for a given11
t ∈ [δ + γ, 1− δ − γ] . (21)
We start from a hypothetical situation in which player i faces an aggregate attack A0t
defined by (see green line below)
A0t (θ) :=


1− δ θ < t
δ otherwise.
(22)
We define the set of signals for which a player who would find it optimal to attack
given a conjecture about other players’ behavior Ant by Γ
n. Using this definition we have
An+1t (θ) :=
∫∫
Γn
fx(x− θ)fy(y −Ant (θ)) dx dy (23)
Given this definition of An+1t , it follows by induction from the inequalities in Lemma
2 that Ant ≥ 1− δ (≤ δ) for θ ≤ t (otherwise) for all n ≥ 0.
To complete the proof of Proposition 2 we use the theorem of Arzelà–Ascoli to show
that the sequence Ant has a convergent subsequence. That is, we note that A
n
t are con-
tinuous, uniformly bounded (by zero and one), and have a uniformly bounded derivative
for all θ 6= t, which implies equicontinuity. Hence, the preconditions of the Arzelà–Ascoli
theorem are met12 on each interval [−k, t] (define Ant at t by the right limit) and [t, k+1]
for k ∈ N (they are also met for subsequences). Hence, for k = 1 there is a convergent
subsequence on [−1, t] denoted by An1t , from which we can select yet another convergent
subsequence on [t, 2] (and thus on [−1, 2]) denoted by An2t . We can carry out the same
procedure for each k > 1, and receive a (sub)sequence An2kt that converges on [−k, k+1].
Last but not least, select the k-th element of sequence An2kt to create a new sequence A
n0
t .
This sequence is a subsequence of a converging sequence, and hence it converges.
We denote the limit of this sequence by At. It constitutes an equilibrium due to the
continuity of the best-response operator.
11The requirement 1− δ ≥ γ, 1 > 3δ+2γ in Proposition 2 implies that the interval is non-degenerated.
12See, e.g., Shilov (2013, p. 32).
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B Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is an adapted version of the proof of Proposition 2. Again, we first state and
proof a supporting lemma:
Lemma 3. Suppose that for a given t A(θ) ∈ [1−δ, 1] if θ < t, and A(θ) ∈ [0, δ] otherwise.
Then the following holds:
1. If zi ≥ 1− δ − t− γ then P [θ < t|A(·), zi] ≥ c.
2. If zi ≤ δ − t + γ, then P [θ ≥ t|A(·), zi] ≥ c.
3. P [zi ≥ 1− δ − t− γ|A(·), θ < t] ≥ 1− δ
4. P [zi ≤ δ − t + γ|A(·), θ ≥ t] ≥ 1− δ
Proof. 1. To prove the first inequality in 1. we define
κN :=
∫ t+N
t
g(zi −A(θ) + θ) dθ∫ t
t−N g(zi − A(θ) + θ) dθ
,
and show that both inequalities in 1. can be reduced to statements about κN .
P [θ < t|A(·), zi] = lim
N→∞
P [θ < t ∧ zi|A(·),U tN ]
P [zi|A(·),U tN ]
= lim
N→∞
∫ t+N
t
g(zi −A(θ) + θ) dθ∫ t+N
t
g(zi − A(θ) + θ) dθ +
∫ t+N
t
g(zi − A(θ) + θ) dθ
= lim
N→∞
1
1 + κN
≥ c⇔ lim
N→∞
κN ≤ 1− c
c
Due to continuity of g there exist αN ∈ [0, δ] and βN ∈ [1− δ, 1] such that
κN =
∫ t+N
t
g(zi − αN + θ) dθ∫ t
t−N g(zi − βN + θ) dθ
=
G(z − αN + θ +N)−G(z − αN + θ)
G(z − βN + θ)−G(z − βN + θ −N)
−→
N→∞
1−G(z − α+ θ)
G(z − β + θ) ≤
1− c
c
,
where α ∈ [0, δ] and β ∈ [1− δ, 1] are the limits of the respective sequence. The last
inequality uses condition (10) and implies that P [θ < t|A(·), zi] ≥ c.
2. The proof of property 2. works along the lines of step 1., or alternatively like step
2. in the proof of Lemma 2.
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3. To prove the third property, we use the notation Ant (t
−) to denote left limits of the
function At depicted in Diagram 3:
P [zi ≥ 1− δ − t− γ|A(·), θ < t] ≥ P [zi ≥ 1− δ − t− γ|A(θ) = 1− δ, θ = t−]
= P [ρi ≥ −γ] = 1−G(−γ) = G(γ) ≥ 1− δ
The last but one equality holds due G being symmetric, the last equality due to
condition (11).
4. Part 4. follows from:
P [zi ≤ δ − t + γ|A(·), θ ≥ t] ≥ P [zi ≤ δ − t+ γ|A(θ) = δ, θ = t]
= P [ρi ≤ γ] = G(γ) ≥ 1− δ
Again, the last equality is due to condition (11).
The remaining part of the proof of Proposition 2 applies directly with two exceptions:
1. For given An there exists a cutoff zn such that a player attacks iff zi < zn. This
allows to adjust the definition of An+1t given A
n
t ;.
An+1t (θ) :=
∫ zn
−∞
g(z − Ant (θ) + θ)) dz .
2. To establish equicontinuity of Ant , we start with another supporting Lemma:
Lemma 4. Suppose agents consider the aggregate attack (function) to be equal to
Ant and that A
n
t (θ) > t+ δ for θ < t, and A
n
t (θ) < t− δ otherwise. Then, the agent’s
attack cutoff is zn ∈ (−γ, γ).
Proof. An agent receiving a signal zi ≥ γ would attack, where we use the notation
Ant (t
−) to denote left limits and Ant (t
+) to denote right limits:
P [θ < t|zi = z, Ant ] = 13
G(z − Ant (t−) + t)
G(z −Ant (t−) + t) + 1−G(z − Ant (t+) + t)
≥ 14 1−G(z + δ)
G(z − δ) + 1−G(z + δ) = P [θ < t|zi = z, A
0
t ] > P
∗
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Hence, for the cutoff zn < γ has to hold. On the other hand, zn > −γ holds, as an
agent receiving a signal zi ≤ −γ would not attack:
P [θ ≥ t|zi = z, Ant ] =
1−G(z − Ant (t+) + t)
G(z −Ant (t−) + t) + 1−G(z − Ant (t+) + t)
≥ 1−G(z + δ)
G(z − δ) + 1−G(z + δ) = P [θ ≥ t|zi = z, A
0
t ] > 1− P ∗
Now, note that Ant are continuous, uniformly bounded and have a uniformly bounded
derivative for all θ 6= t:
dAn+1t
dθ
(θ) = −g(zn −Ant (θ) + θ)
(
dAnt
dθ
(θ)− 1
)
= −g(zn −Ant (θ) + θ)
1− g(zn −Ant (θ) + θ)n
1− g(zn −Ant (θ) + θ)
≥ −max
{
g(γ − δ) 1− g(γ − δ)
n
1− g(γ − δ) , g(−γ + δ)
1− g(−γ + δ)n
1− g(−γ + δ)
}
>
−g(γ − δ)
1− g(γ − δ)
The second equality can be shown by induction using
dA0t
dθ
(θ) = 0. We use the
notation to Ant (t
−) for the right limit of Ant for θ → t. The first inequality holds
because g is increasing (decreasing) on θ < t (otherwise), zn ∈ (−γ, γ) (Lemma 4),
and Ant (θ) ≥ t+δ on θ < t and Ant (θ) < t−δ otherwise. The second inequality holds
due to the symmetry of g and condition (12). Also note, that the second equality
implies that the derivative of Ant is non-positive. Thus, we have established uniform
upper and lower bounds.
C Conditional Probability
We have to show that, limz∗→−∞ P (A(θ, z∗)−θ > 0|z∗) = 0 and limz∗→∞ P (A(θ, z∗)−θ >
0|z∗) = 1. To do so, we recall that zi = A− θ + σzξi with ξi ∼ N (0, 1), and examine the
14Use analogous computations as in step 2.
14The inequality can be shown by rearranging the following inequality:
G(z −An
t
(t−) + t)
G(z − δ) ≥ 1 ≥
1−G(z −An
t
(t+) + t)
1−G(z + δ)
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conditional probability:
P (A(θ, z∗)− θ > 0|z∗) = c. (24)
We begin by defining y(θ, z∗) := A(θ, z∗)− θ, and we recall Bayes’s formula:
f(y|z∗) = h(z
∗|y)f(y)∫∞
−∞ h(z
∗|y)f(y)dy, (25)
Where h(z∗|y) is a normal distribution. Moreover, we note that:
f(y(θ)) = g(θ(y))
dθ
dy
. (26)
Where dθ
dy
= 1
Aθ(θ,z∗)−1 . Recalling (17), A = 1 − Φ(
√
αz(z
∗ − A + θ)), we note that
Aθ(θ, z
∗) = −
√
αzφ(
√
αz(z∗−A+θ))
1−√αzφ(√αz(z∗−A+θ)) < 0, for Aj, j = 1, 3. Agents hold a uniform uninformative
prior over θ, such that g(θ) is a constant g¯. Moreover, we have limz∗→∞Aθ = 0 and thus
limz∗→∞ dθdy = −1 and f(y) = −1g¯. Substituting into (25) yields:
lim
z∗→∞
f(y|z∗) = lim
z∗→∞
h(z∗|y)∫∞
−∞ h(z
∗|y)dy , (27)
where h(z∗|y) = φ(√αz(z∗ − y)). Finally, we have:
lim
z∗→∞
P (y > 0|z∗) = lim
z∗→∞
∫∞
0
h(z∗|y)∫∞
−∞ h(z
∗|y)dy = limz∗→∞Φ(αzz
∗) = 1. (28)
The same argument can be made to show that limz∗→−∞ P (y > 0|z∗) = 0.
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